Flavio Menezes

Research undertaken by Professor Menezes has contributed to several areas in economics:

1. Competition and regulatory economics: Prof Menezes’s research on competition economics is frequently cited in regulatory proceedings in Australia and overseas. For example, his advisory work on incentive mechanisms is cited in submissions to the Australian Energy Regulator and the IPART. His advisory work on asset valuation is cited in decisions by the Australian Energy Regulator and ERA. His research on the economic theory of auction and market design underpinned his expert reports that were pivotal in the Australian Competition Tribunal’s 2017 decision on the $11B merger of Tabcorp and Tatts Group. Professor Menezes’s research on public-private partnerships underpinned advice provide to governments and international organisations on how to procure complex transport infrastructure.
2. Price regulation approaches for aged care: The Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety engaged Prof Menezes to review price regulation approaches that may be appropriate for application in the aged care sector. Prof Menezes’s advice directly informed the recommendation to introduce an independent Pricing Authority in the aged care sector (Royal Commission Final Report 2021, p.150).
3. Competition and design in auctions: Prof Menezes’s research on multiple-unit auctions has been used to explain low revenue in some spectrum auctions in the United States and in Europe. Spectrum auctions have been redesigned as a result and his work is cited in patent applications for Clock Auctions (patent no. US7729975B2) and by Google (patent no. US8204818B1). His research on right-to-choose auctions provided an alternative design for the sale of a set of commonly ranked objectives. It has been considered to allocate spectrum of frequency and landing slots at airports and is cited in patents for computer-based right distribution systems (patent no. US7689210B2).
4. Entry and corruption in auctions: Prof Menezes’s research has provided important insights into market design across a range of sectors. When entry into auctions is endogenous, having a larger number of potential bidders does not necessary lead to higher expected revenue in an auction; this implies that efforts to secure many bidders may be misplaced, and instead focus should be on competitive bidders. Moreover, when corruption is possible, particular care needs to be taken when designing auctions to minimise the impact of corruption on efficiency and on the seller’s revenue.