Brian Key

Towards closure of the fish pain debate

We are seeking an Arts-Biomedical Science graduate to partake in this ambitious project.

Arguments to the effect that certain animals do or do not have feelings, such as pain, are presumptive arguments. Like legal arguments, presumptive arguments are defeasible arguments, the conclusions of which are thought to be rationally acceptable on the balance of considerations (Walton 1996, 2011). Also like legal arguments, they invite paradoxical worries about how an argument can be both defeasible yet rationally binding (Walton et al, 2008). In legal contexts, we do not have the luxury of leaving questions of guilt or innocence hanging. A decision must be made. So too in matters pertaining to animal welfare, it is necessary to evaluate whether we have sufficient reason to decide whether a particular species of animal does or does not feel pain if we are to ensure that our treatment of that species is ethically appropriate.

Each of the arguments in the animal consciousness debate can and has been evaluated on its own terms, but an interesting pattern emerges when viewed together as constituting a single dialogue involving multiple reasoners operating on divergent background assumptions and principles of reasoning. From this perspective, it can be seen where the blockages to consensus lie and what it would take to move the debate towards some form of closure so that decisions of importance to animal welfare could be undertaken with more confidence than they currently are. No meta-analysis of this debate as an instance of multi-agent reasoning has hitherto been undertaken. The overarching aim of this project is to conduct just such an analysis in an effort to identify principles that both sides of the debate might rationally agree upon and move the debate towards epistemic closure.

The principal aims are:

Aim 1. To reconstruct the debate about pain in non-human animals as an instance of multi-agent reasoning or dialogue to clarify precise points of agreement and disagreement,

Aim 2. To argue for shared principles of reasoning drawing on available neuroscientific evidence in order to create avenues towards closure, and

Aim 3. To address concerns about moral risk exceeding epistemic risk in judgements about non-human animal pain.